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Outsourcing, Modularity, and the Theory of the Firm
Margaret M. Blair, Erin O'Hara O'Connor, and Gregg ICirchboefer
ABSTRACT
Firms have increasingly moved productive activities from within to
outside the firm through outsourcing arrangements. According to some
estimates, the value of outsourcing contracts has been nearly 100 billion
dollars per year since 2004. Firm outsourcing happens for a number of
reasons, including to save labor costs, capture the benefits of regulatory
arbitrage, and take advantage of economies of scale in the provision of
firm needs. We review a number of outsourcing contracts for evidence
that contract techniques are used to help modularize the relationship
between the firm and its service provider. Consistent with what
modularity theory might predict, some contract terms seem to work to
thin the interactions between the firm and its service provider, and this
thinning serves to make contracting for otherwise intrafirm services
more feasible. Other contract terms serve to help the parties manage the
fact that inevitably their relationship will be thick with interactions.
* Professor of Law and Milton R. Underwood Chair in Free Enterprise at Vanderbilt
University Law School; Professor of Law and 2010-2011 FedEx Research Professor at
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October, 2008, including Robert Thompson, Charles Sabel, Todd Zenger, Jeffrey Parker, and
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the practice of "outsourcing" and "offshoring" of
production and services by firms in a wide range of industries has
become quite common.' This represents a change in the
organization of production in many firms, from inside to outside the
firm. As such, it challenges theorists in management, economics, and
the law to rethink some of the accepted explanations that theorists
have offered about the boundaries of the firm. Why is it that some
productive activity is organized entirely within the boundaries of
individual firms, while other activities are organized through
contracts, either via arms-length market exchanges or by longer-term
formal contracts?
Theories that attempt to explain why business organizers choose
one structure rather than another-governance by contractual
agreement, for example, rather than governance within a firm-are
called "theories of the firm." Among the most well-accepted ideas in
the "theory of the firm" literature is that productive activities will
tend to be carried out within a single firm, governed by hierarchical
decision-making, when the "transactions costs" associated with using
markets or contracts are higher than the costs of using internal
hierarchy.2 If this is correct, then the widespread shift among
1. Data collected by a private firm, Technology Partners International, Inc., indicate
that the "total contract value" of outsourcing contracts that exceeded $25 million in value
reached a peak of $96.8 billion worldwide in 2004, and ranged from about $85 billion to $97
billion from 2004 through 2008. Total contract value was substantially smaller in the first half
of 2009 as the world was gripped by an unusually bad recession. TECH. PARTNERS INT'L, INC.,
THE TPI INDEX: AN INFORMED VIEW OF THE STATE OF THE GLOBAL COMMERCIAL
OUTSOURCING MARKET SECOND QUARTER AND FIRST HALF 2009 6 (2009),
http://www.tpi.net/pdf/index/2Q09_TPIIndex-Presentation.pdf (last visited Mar. 25,
2011). It is too early to tell whether the fall off in outsourcing activity in 2009 is temporary
and will resume when business activity in general increases, but there are reasons to believe that
the global credit crisis of 2008-09 exposed vulnerabilities in outsourcing "supply chains" that
may make the strategy less attractive to many firms. See generally VINAY COUTO ET AL.,
OFFSHORING RESEARCH NETWORK, THE GLOBALIZATION OF WHITE-COLLAR WORK: THE
FACTS AND FALLOUT OF NEXT-GENERATION OFFSHORING, http://www.booz.com/media/
uploads/TheGlobalizationofWhite-CollarWork.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2011); MARI SAKO,
SAID BUSINESS SCHOOL, OXFORD UNIVERSITY, OUTSOURCING AND OFFSHORING: KEY
TRENDS AND ISSUES (2005) (discussing outsourcing and offshoring practices by international
business organization).
2. The literature on transactions cost theories of the firm began with Ronald H. Coase,
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). Oliver E. Williamson developed the idea
in OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975), and transactions cost approaches to understanding organizational
design have been a repeated theme in Williamson's work.
265
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multinational companies toward outsourcing-in which production
activities that had previously been carried out within vertically
integrated firms are arranged through one or more contracts across
"supply chains" of different firms-suggests that either the cost of
contracting has fallen in a variety of settings, or the cost of internal
governance has risen (or both).
Yet we understand little about what has happened to change the
relative costs of contracting and internal governance. Some observers
have off-handedly noted that transportation and communications
costs have declined dramatically with the advent of the Internet,' but
it is not obvious that declines in the cost of these inputs have been
greater for travel and communication across firm boundaries than
they have for travel and exchanges among participants within the
same firm.
Another common explanation for increased outsourcing is that
outsourcing makes it possible for western companies to take
advantage of lower-cost labor in Asia, Latin America, and Eastern
Europe.' But here again, a firm need not outsource to take
advantage of cheaper labor; it can often lower its labor costs simply
by relocating its own operations to where the labor is cheaper.s
In fact, outsourcing to service providers in low wage countries
might entail substantial increases in writing and enforcing contracts
3. See, e.g., Pete Engardio et. al., The Future of Outsourcing: How It's Transforming
Whole Industries and Changing the Way We Work, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 30, 2006, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/06_05/b3969401.htm?chan=gl
(providing numerous examples of firms outsourcing engineering and design, customer service,
software development, finance and accounting, human resources management, and other
information-intensive work to other firms, both in the U.S. and abroad, while managing the
work flow on new "IT" (information technology) platforms created for the activities). See also
Manuel Gonzalez-Diaz & Luis Vazquez, Make-or-Buy Decisions: A New Institutional
Economics Approach, in NEW INSTITUTIONAL EcONOMICS: A GUIDEBOOK 255, 256 (Eric
Brousseau & Jean-Michel Glachant eds., 1990) ("[I]mprovements in information and
communications technologies make it easier to identify potential partners and to communicate
with them."); Charles Perrow, Modeling Firms in the Global Economy, 38 THEORY & SOc'Y
217, 217 (2009) (explaining deverticalization of firms as due in part to "cheap and rapid
transport").
4. Engardio, supra note 3, at 3 ("The prime motive of most corporate bean counters
jumping on the offshoring bandwagon has been to take advantage of. . . 'labor arbitrage'-the
huge wage gap between industrialized and developing nations.").
5. See IBM Co., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 53 (2008). While numerous corporations have
outsourced information technology services and business processes to firms in India such as
Wipro and Infosys, for example, IBM has developed a wholly owned subsidiary, IBM India. As
of 2008, IBM had almost as many employees in Brazil, Russia, India, and China (113,000) as
it had in the U.S. (115,000). Id.
266
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given that, in many cases, rule of law institutions in these countries
are significantly weaker than those in the United States.' Thus, it is
not obvious to us that either lower transportation and
communications costs, or lower labor costs in developing countries,
would by themselves necessarily encourage outsourcing to offshore
companies.
We do not here offer a completely satisfactory answer to the
puzzle of the recent growth in outsourcing, but we believe that
outsourcing contracts can help to inform both the "why" and the
"how" of business arrangements moved outside the firm. Put
differently, we believe that the parties' contracting arrangements
could reveal something about any such new contracting mechanisms
tailored to outsourcing, and help us understand the residual
concerns of the firms involved.
Thus, we examine the structure and content of a small number
of contracts that corporations have entered into to govern
outsourcing relationships. Such contracts constitute written evidence
of an effort by the outsourcing or "customer" firm to separate out
production activities along new lines, or in some new dimension, so
that an outside firm can perform those activities. If the activities were
previously performed in-house, what are the problems associated
with separating them out that the customer and supplier firms must
anticipate and provide for in the contracts? What are the new
governance arrangements that the parties hope will enable them to
carry out the work successfully across firm boundaries? And how are
these arrangements expected to work?
Specifically, we examine seven outsourcing contracts and some
associated documents provided to us by Kirkland & Ellis LLP's
Chicago office, which has a sizeable practice in the negotiation and
drafting of outsourcing contracts. Each contract provided to us was
6. James Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An
Empirical Investigation, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 342 (2002) (estimating that insecurity
associated both with contractual enforcement problems and with corruption increase trade
costs by about 16 percent, and thereby reduce trade); See also James E. Anderson & Eric van
Wincoop, Trade Costs, 42 J. ECON. LIT. 691 (2004) (discussing factors that affect the cost of
international trade).
7. Anderson & van Wincoop, supra note 6, at 721 ("[I1nternal contracting costs
within a firm are much lower than external contracting costs. Specifically, the tax equivalent of
the trading costs of a foreign affiliate of a U.S. multinational with unaffiliated U.S. firms is on
average 37 percent higher . . . than the trading costs with its U.S. parent.").
267
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redacted to conceal the identities of the parties,' and each involves a
U.S.-based corporation arranging to have a substantial activity such
as business services, data management, or manufacturing performed
outside the United States by another firm. In each case, employees
within the outsourcing firm previously had performed the activities.
And in each case, the contracts were intended to
govern a relationship that the parties expected to last for a substantial
number of years.
We evaluate provisions of these contracts through the lens of a
theory of production in firms articulated recently by Harvard
Business School Professor Carliss Baldwin.' Professor Baldwin builds
on the notion of "modularity" in production-which is a way of
thinking about the degree to which activities at one stage of
production are interconnected with, and dependent upon, activities
at other stages-to develop a theory to explain where we should
expect to find activities carried out within the same firm, rather than
across boundaries between firms. We believe modularity theory helps
to illuminate how contract structure and terms help both to facilitate
and to manage the outsourcing relationship. This framework also
suggests where contracting party tensions may arise in the new
business arrangements.
In Part II, we briefly review the theory-of-the-firm literature and
explain the concept of modularity as it applies to this literature. Then
we consider how modularization of a production process might
make it easier to govern the process by contract rather than by
internal hierarchy, and what characteristics of a production process
help to make it modular. We further suggest that the contracts
themselves may help to modularize production-indeed, that
sufficiently sophisticated contracts may help to offset or overcome
interconnectedness that arises from purely physical production
attributes.
In Part III, we describe some of the relevant terms of seven
outsourcing contracts. We also describe how various features of these
8. One of the authors (Kirchhoefer), of course, knows who the counterparties involved
in each contract are, and provided general descriptions of the counterparties. These
descriptions are reported in the Appendix.
9. See Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do Transactions Come From? Modularity, Transactions,
and the Boundaries of Firms, 17 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 155 (2007) (discussing the origins
of the idea of modularity in organizational design). Professor Baldwin is a leading contributor
to the theory of modularity in firm organization.
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contracts appear to us to be designed to help "modularize" aspects
of production, so that they can more easily be governed across firms
rather than by fiat within a single firm.
In Part IV, we offer some tentative observations about how these
contractual governance arrangements help to reduce the transactions
costs of outsourcing relative to hierarchical governance. We also
compare our seven contracts to a larger sample of outsourcing
contracts assembled by Professor George Geis'0 to see whether the
clauses that we believe help facilitate these outsourcing arrangements
are also found in the contracts Geis studied. And we compare our
contracts and observations based on them to an extensive analysis of
three contracts studied by Professors Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel,
and Robert Scott."
In addition, we briefly discuss a few outsourcing relationship
disputes that have resulted in litigation for insight into unresolved
problems that some novel contract provisions might present.
We conclude with the observation that outsourcing contracts
offer a potentially productive source of insights into the theory of the
firm, especially theories about the location of the boundaries of
firms. They also provide insight into the economy-wide factors that
have been driving outsourcing, and into the effects of outsourcing
over time on the firms and industries that reorganize in this way.
II. HIERARCHY AND MODULARITY IN THE THEORY OF THE FIRM
Although economists have been studying the theory of the firm
for nearly a century, 2 neither theorists nor empirical researchers have
10. The Geis contracts were assembled to study the extent to which outsourcing
contract terms are used to attempt to mitigate hold up and agency costs. A discussion of the
contracts and the study can be found in George S. Geis, An Empirical Examination of Business
Outsourcing Transactions, 96 VA. L. REv. 241 (2010) [hereinafter Outsourcing Transactions].
Geis focuses on how the contracts manage "agency costs"-the costs associated with
controlling opportunism between the contracting parties-a subject he explores in an earlier
article. George S. Geis, The Space Between Markets and Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REV. 99, 110
(2009).
11. Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and
Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 431 (2009) (focusing on how the contracting
parties manage innovation).
12. In 1921, Frank H. Knight laid the theoretical groundwork for much of the theory
of the firm in RISK, UNCERTAINTY, & PROFIT (1921), which was based on his dissertation, A
Theory of Business Profit, completed in 1916 at Cornell University. Frank Knight, WIKIPEDIA,
http://n.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_- Knight (last visited Mar. 25, 2011). Coase, supra note
2, is generally regarded as the first essay to directly pose the question of why some productive
269
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reached agreement about the primary factors that cause business
organizers to buy some inputs in spot markets, while forming long-
term contracts for other inputs, and generating still other inputs
from within their firm. Most economists agree with Coase that the
choice of whether to "make" or "buy" an input probably has
something to do with the relative transactions costs associated with
each approach." But they disagree over what factors cause
transactions costs to be higher in markets than in internal production
(or vice versa).
Some economists essentially assume away the question by
regarding the governance of relationships within a firm as no
different from governing relationships by contract-a firm is just a
"nexus" of contracts, they say.' 4 Others stress that the important
difference between within-firm governance and contractual
governance has to do with differences in the incentives created by
these two forms. In particular, they argue that relationships governed
through markets and contracts generally involve more "high-
powered" incentives for the parties to maximize the productivity and
profitability of each step in the productive process.' 5 Under some
activity is carried out in markets while other productive activity takes place within firms, where
market signals are suppressed in favor of "the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs
production." Id. at 388.
13. Id.
14. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (emphasizing the contractual nature
(voluntary exchange) of the relationships of participants in a firm and rejecting the idea that
the defining feature of a firm is the authority of the "entrepreneur-co-ordinator"). In fact, the
authors assert that there is nothing special about the relationship between the managers and
employees of a firm that in any way gives managers more "control," going so far as to assert
that the manager no more controls an employee than a customer controls the grocer from
whom she buys bread or tuna fish. Id. at 777. See also Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. EcON. 305, 310 (1976) (arguing that "contractual relations are the essence of a firm,"
and that a firm is a "nexus for a set of contracting relationship among individuals") (emphasis
omitted). Jensen and Meckling emphasize the "agency problem" in the governance of
contractual relationships, in which one party (the agent) acts on behalf of the other party (the
principal), and the problem is how to get the agent to faithfully attempt to serve the interests
of the principal. Id. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1426-28 (1989), introduced the "nexus of contracts" idea, with focus
on the agency problem, to corporate law, where it continues to be highly influential.
15. Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, The Firm as an Incentive System, 84 AM. ECON.
REV. 972 (1994), were among the first scholars to use the phrases "high-powered incentive
systems" and "low-powered incentive systems" in describing the role of incentives in within-
firm management. See also Todd R. Zenger & William S. Hesterly, The Disaggregation of
Corporations: Selective Intervention, High-Powered Incentives, and Molecular Units, 8 ORG. SCI.
270
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conditions, high-powered incentives may lead to greater overall
efficiencies. But where the steps in the production process, or in
different aspects of the enterprise, are interdependent, high-powered
incentives can lead parties to engage in wasteful attempts to shift
costs or risks onto other parties to the enterprise. In such a situation,
theorists have argued, it might be better to organize within a single
firm, where managers can use a variety of different organizational
and reward schemes to try to elicit cooperation.16
But what factors cause production stages to be interdependent?
Interdependence can occur when a party to the enterprise makes
investments in assets that are specific to that enterprise. In that case,
others participating in the enterprise can take advantage of this firm-
specific investment by demanding a larger share of the profits
generated by the enterprise or by forcing greater liabilities and risks
onto the investing party than the investor thought she would bear
when she made the decision to invest. The party making the
investment would be vulnerable to this "hold up" by the others
because those assets will not produce the hoped-for return without
full cooperation from all parties." Thus, Oliver Williamson and
others have argued that where such investments are important, it
may often be cheaper to carry out the various steps within a single
209 (1997). Incentive schemes are "high-powered" if efficiency gains in a transaction are
allocated directly to the participants in the transaction, as would be the case if the parties were
transacting in a market with their own assets. They are "low-powered" if the benefit of
efficiency gains affects the transacting parties only indirectly, such as when the parties are paid a
fixed wage with a bonus that depends only partly on the individual's efficiency gains, or on the
efficiency gains of a larger group.
16. See Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analysis:
Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991);
Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 15; Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, The Boundaries of
the Firm Revisited, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 73 (1998) (discussing the benefits of single-firm
organization).
17. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2; OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and
Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691
(1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL.
EcoN. 1119 (1990) (exploring ofthe "hold-up" problem caused by firm specific investments);
Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); see also Gilson et al., supra note 11, at 482-
89 (arguing that a particular variety of firm-specific investments in knowledge increases the
"switching costs" for parties in the contracts they study, yet also arguing that such investments
tie the contracting parties together more tightly, and that the benefit of these ties more than
offsets the costs of increased mutual vulnerability).
271
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firm." Within-firm production, in which all of the highly specific
assets are owned by a single entity, is thought to work better in such
cases. If specific assets are owned by a single entity that is carrying
out the entire enterprise itself, then the firm's managers might be
able to maximize the efficiency of the joint enterprise, and
participants will have fewer opportunities and incentives to try to
push costs or risks onto another party within the entity. 9 Implicit in
this theory is that the potential for costly disputes among participants
in an enterprise can be mitigated if the participants are all subject to
the authority of a hierarchical decision-making process within a
single firm.20
Management theorists have recently explored a contributor to
interdependence that stresses technological differences between
production activities performed within firms and activities carried out
across firms. Specifically, if the work of an enterprise can be
organized into "modular" units, then interdependence between
units is greatly reduced. Indeed, modularity is defined as a measure
of the interdependence of steps in the production process. 21 A
18. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2; WILLIAMSON, supra note 17; see also Paul L.
Joskow, Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence, 4 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 95 (1988) (surveying evidence from several empirical studies that generally
supports the hypothesis that investment in specific assets leads to vertical integration).
19. Klein et al., supra note 17, observe that in the 1920s, General Motors purchased
auto bodies from Fisher Body Co., but when GM asked Fisher to build a plant adjacent to a
new GM facility, Fisher initially refused. The authors speculate that this was because such a
plant would be so dependent upon GM for its business. In response, GM integrated vertically
by purchasing the whole Fisher Body company and making it a captive supplier to GM plants.
Details of this account have been disputed in subsequent literature on the GM-Fisher
relationship. See, e.g., Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber, The Fable of Fisher
Body, 43 J.L. & ECON. 67 (2000) (debating the significance of the Fisher Body case); Ronald
H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 J.L. & EcON. 15 (2000); see
also ERIC BROUSSEAU & JEAN-MICHEL GLACHANT, NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICs: A
GUIDEBOOK 16 (2008) (summarizing empirical findings that "specific investment[] is both a
statistically and economically important causal factor in influencing the decision to vertically
integrate"); Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries:
The Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LIT. 629 (2007).
20. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 278 (1999) (explaining the role of a board of directors in a
corporation and arguing that participants in the firm "enter into this mutual agreement in an
effort to reduce wasteful shirking and rent-seeking by relegating to the internal hierarchy the
right to determine the division of duties and resources in the joint enterprise").
21. See Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, Managing in an Age of Modularity, 75
HARv. Bus. REv. 84, 84 (Sept.-Oct. 1997) (defining modularity as "building a complex
product or process from smaller subsystems that can be designed independently yet function
together as a whole"). The idea of modularity in production was popularized by Shawn Tully,
272
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"module" is a component or a step in production that can be carried
out separately from other steps or components, but is linked to those
other steps through a common interface that allows it to link in
multiple ways to more than one other type of component or step.22
The more "modular" different steps of production are, then, the less
interdependent, and the easier it should be to govern the
relationships among parties carrying out the steps by contracts rather
than by within-firm hierarchical arrangements. For example,
enterprise-specific investments at related or sequential stages of
production tend to reduce modularity, while the use of standardized
equipment, parts, metrics, and processes tends to increase
modularity. The literature on modularity in production offers a
useful framework for understanding and explaining the rapid growth
in outsourcing by large firms. In this Part we briefly review the
literature on the role of hierarchy in firms, especially firms where
knowledge is an essential asset (Subpart A), and then we review the
literature on the problem of modularity and interconnectivity
between steps in the production process (Subpart B). Subpart B also
identifies some implications of modularity for outsourcing contracts.
A. The Role of Hierarchy
Corporations and other business organizations typically are
characterized by hierarchical governance. Hierarchical governance
has been explained as a mechanism for gathering, processing and
The Modular Corporation, FORTUNE, Feb. 8, 1993, at 106; see also CARLISS Y. BALDWIN &
KIM B. CLARK, 1 DESIGN RULES: THE POWER OF MODULARITY 63 (2000) (defining
modularity); Bruce M. Kogut & Edward H. Bowman, Modularity and Permeability as
Principles ofDesign, in REDESIGNING THE FIRM 243 (Edward H. Bowman & Bruce M. Kogut
eds., 1995); Melissa A. Schilling & H. Kevin Steensma, The Use of Modular Organizational
Forms: An Industry-Level Analysis, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1149 (2000) (using logic of systems
modularity to explain why some industries are highly integrated and others make greater use of
modular forms); Timothy J. Sturgeon, Modular Production Networks: A New American Model
of Industrial Organization, 11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2002) (discussing
independence found within modular units); Karl Ulrich, The Role ofProduct Architecture in the
Manufacturing Firm, 24 RES. POL'Y 419 (1995).
22. See John Paul MacDuffie & Susan Helper, Collaboration in Supply Chains: With and
Without Trust, in THE FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY: RECONSTRUCTING TRUST
IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 417 (Charles Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds., 2006) (noting
that the term "module" was first used to describe the components of a product, rather than
the steps in a production process, and that as such, modules are "elements that are
interdependent within, and independent across" elements); see also Perrow, supra note 3, at
222 ("[P]arts that must interact with each other in complex ways should be confined to a
module whose only interaction with the rest of the system is through an interface.").
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distilling relevant information, for channeling such information to
the parties who have decision-making authority within firms, and for
coordinating an organization's activities and responses to new
information.2 3 Hierarchy has also been explained as a mechanism for
resolving disputes among participants in the enterprise about who is
responsible for what, and about how surpluses created by the
enterprise are to be divided.24 Both explanations are consistent with
the idea that governance by fiat can help to overcome certain kinds
of problems that would arise in purely contractual relationships. This
idea goes back at least to the work of Herbert Simon,2 5 who stressed
that the employment relationship is central to understanding the
nature of the firm. He suggested that a firm is different from a
contractual relationship in that participants in a firm are employees,
constrained in their relationships to each other by a hierarchical
decision-making structure. The essence of the employment
relationship, Simon claimed, is that the hiring party gets to decide
the employee's activities, the production methods employed, and the
relevant standards for both.2 6
Although legal scholars neglected the role of firm hierarchy for
27many years, in recent years economists and legal scholars have
returned to the topic. Blair and Stout, for example, argue that
corporate law creates a mechanism by which ultimate control over
important assets and decisions involved in "team production"
activities are taken away from the team members who are carrying
out the activities and granted to an internal hierarchy headed by a
board of directors. 28 Blair and Stout borrow Alchian and Demsetz's
definition of "team production" as "production in which 1) several
types of resources are used . . . 2) the product is not the sum of
separable outputs of each cooperating resource . . . [and] 3) not all
23. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 20, at 263 (discussing the mechanism of
hierarchical governance).
24. Id. at 278.
25. See HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF MAN (1957) (exploring the nature of the
employment relationship).
26. Id.
27. This neglect, we believe, was due at least in part to the influence of Alchian &
Demsetz, who argued that the employment relationship is not the essence of the firm. Alchian
& Demsetz, supra note 14, at 777.
28. See Blair & Stout, supra note 20, at 278-79 (discussing the hierarchical structure of
decision-making authority in corporations).
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resources used in team production belong to one person."2
Economists since Holmstrom have understood that, because the
output of team production is nonseparable, there is no ex ante
decision-rule that can allocate the output among the team members
in a way that gives all of them clear incentives to make the optimal
level of effort and contribution to the enterprise.3 0 Hierarchical
governance arrangements can alleviate these incentive problems.
How does hierarchy solve the problem? The theory is that, if
team members mutually agree to yield control to a manager or
executive, they are then better able to make credible commitments
to cooperate and not to act opportunistically toward one another.32
Corporate law, in particular, facilitates team production, according
to Blair and Stout-not only by establishing governance by a board
of directors, but also by creating a separate legal entity to hold the
assets, thereby making it difficult for shareholders, as well as
managers or employees or other corporate participants, to extract
assets once they have been committed to the corporation.
Holmstrom and Milgrom argue that a firm is characterized by the
employee (1) "not owning the assets," (2) "being subject to a 'low-
powered incentive scheme ,"' and (3) "being subject to the
29. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 779. But while Alchian and Demsetz
downplayed the importance of the employment relationship in resolving problems that arise in
team production, Blair and Stout emphasize the importance of hierarchy and governance by
fiat. See supra note 20.
30. Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982).
31. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in the Theory of a Firm, 113 Q. J.
ECON. 387 (1998); see also SIMON, supra note 25.
32. The control that a corporation's executives and board exercises over employees, by
this theory, derives in part from the fact that the board, and its designees, control who has
access to critical assets owned by the corporation. Moreover, the employees have opted to yield
to such control by choosing to work in the firm. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 17; Rajan
& Zingales, supra note 31.
33. See Blair & Stout, supra note 20, at 282-283 (noting that participants in firms
contribute investments that are then owned by the firm). This is similar to the role identified
by the asset partitioning theory in Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2001).
34. See Margaret Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 427 (2003).
35. See Nicolai J. Foss, Henrik Lando & Steen Thomsen, The Theory of the Firm, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICs, THE REGULATION OF CONITRACTS 637-38
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000), available at http://
encyclo.findlaw.com/5610book.pdf. These authors credit Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note
16, with this three-part characterization.
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authority of the employer."" These characteristics are
complementary: a person who does not own assets used in
production should not be given high-powered incentives focused on
short-term narrow measures of performance because she is unlikely
to be motivated to take proper care of the assets if doing so sacrifices
immediate productivity in any way." But if employees are given low-
powered incentives, the employer must be able to exercise authority
over use of the employee's time." Oliver Hart (whose seminal work
in this area adopted a "property rights" based theory of the firm"),
alone and with Sanford Grossman and John Moore, distinguishes
"employment" from "contracting" in terms of who decides which
production method is used. In a contracting relationship, they
observe, the seller chooses the production method, while in an
employment relationship the buyer chooses.40
If hierarchy serves the purposes outlined here, then to
understand outsourcing we need to understand what factors make
hierarchical decision-making less valuable, or otherwise make it
possible to substitute contractual governance for hierarchy."
B. Knowledge, Transfers, and Interdependence of Production
Recent work on the theory of the firm recognizes that one of the
most important assets to be developed and managed within a firm is
knowledge, or the technology of production. The technology of
36. Foss, Lando & Thomsen, supra note 35, at 638. While it seems uncontestable to us
that these features characterize the employment relationship, we do not believe they are
sufficient for defining a "firm," since they would also apply to the relationship between a
homeowner and a day laborer hired to work in the homeowner's yard.
37. Id. (discussing the reason why the incentive instruments are complementary).
38. Id.
39. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 17, at 693-94; Hart & Moore, supra note 17, at
1120-21.
40. Oliver D. Hart, Coase Lecture, Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm, 75
ECONOMICA 404 (2008). However, it is not uncommon in outsourcing contracts for the
customer to specify the production method in rather extensive detail, thus casting doubt on
whether this distinction is dispositive. See discussion infra Part III.B..a.
41. See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q.J. EcON. 1(2008). In the ECONOMICA article, supra note 40, at 406-10, Hart utilized a "toy model"
illustrated by a relationship between a singer and a person who wants to have the singer
perform at a special event. Note that this example involves no physical capital, nor any specific
assets of any kind. Thus there is no role for property rights in the latest model, and Hart does
not attempt to explain how the buyer could compel the seller to use one method rather than
another.
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production is treated as static, or at least as exogenous, in most
economic theories.4 2 Management theorists have studied questions
about how knowledge is developed and used in firms, but so far,
economists have done very little to either model how new ideas are
created and used, or to incorporate those factors into theories of the
firm. But recent work seems to be making progress on these
questions.4
1. The role of knowledge in theories of the firm
A growing body of scholarship in management science attempts
to understand the nature of firms by emphasizing that organizations
have ways of "knowing" things and learning things that individuals
do not.4 s Some of the knowledge of how to produce more or better
goods may eventually be codified (as by patents), but initially it may
42. "It has been a persistent critique that the modern economics of organization
'neglects technology."' Foss, Lando & Thomsen, supra note 35, at 645. See also trica Gorga
& Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards a
Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1123, 1125 (2007) ("This literature
[on theory of the firm], however, has largely ignored one very important variable: knowledge
resources that firms use in the production process."); Bengt Homstrom & John Roberts, The
Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 90 (1998) ("[I]t is surprising that the
leading economic theories of firm boundaries have paid almost no attention to the role of
organizational knowledge." (citation omitted)).
43. Models that appeal to the importance of firm-specific human capital and
commentators that emphasize the importance of "team production" all accept and attempt to
incorporate and explore the implications of specialized knowledge-"firm-specific human
capital." See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2; Grossman & Hart, supra note 17; Hart & Moore,
supra note 17; see also Holmstrom, supra note 30; Blair & Stout, supra note 20. Likewise,
evolutionary theories emphasize that knowledge is accumulated on the job and stored at least
in part in the "routines" by which firms operate. RICHARD NELSON & SIDNEY WINTER, AN
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). But none of this work addresses
how knowledge is created, deployed, and passed from one participant to another. See Sidney
Winter, Toward a Neo-Schumpeterian Theory of the Firm, 15 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1
(2006) (discussing the difficulties involved in attempting to model innovation or
entrepreneurship).
44. See, e.g., Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 42, at 1127 ("We show that law affects
management and production of knowledge. . . . We explain the use of intellectual property
protections, restrictive covenants, and features of compensation systems as responses to firms'
need to bind knowledge.").
45. See NELSON & WINTER, supra note 43, at 99-107 (discussing organizational
routines as a mechanism for storing organizational memory); see also Julia Porter Liebeskind,
Knowledge, Strategy, and the Theory of the Firm, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 93 (1996); J.C.
Spender, Making Knowledge the Basis of a Dynamic Theory of the Firm, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 45 (1996); J.C. Spender & Robert Grant, Knowledge and the Firm: Overview, 17
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 5 (1996); Haridimos Tsoukas, The Firm as a Distributed Knowledge
System: A Constructionist Approach, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 11 (1996).
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be "tacit knowledge," which employees learn as they carry out their
duties, and know intuitively but have not yet written down. Tacit
knowledge may also be imbedded in the "routines" adopted by the
firm," which are not necessarily known in their entirety by any
individual employee, but which can still be carried out by the firm as
a whole."
It may often be the special knowledge that firms possess in these
ways that enables firms to earn "rents" by generating products and
services that are more valuable on the market than the sum of the
opportunity costs of all the inputs. And theory suggests that it is
because much of the knowledge is tacit and/or encoded in internal
routines that participants in the enterprise find it necessary to interact
within a firm, rather than across markets or via contracts.
Knowledge-based theorizing about firms is in its infancy, and still
has many unresolved problems. Some theorists have focused on the
importance of firms' "core competencies," for example, and have
argued that firm managers should construct the boundaries of firms
so that the firms encompass valuable knowledge.48 Other theorists
argue that hierarchical governance is important in firms where
knowledge is important because managers who can direct employees
can facilitate the efficient transfer of knowledge within the
46. NELSON & WINTER, supra note 43.
47. See Winter, supra note 43, at 45 ("Does anybody in the large firm know what's
going on? Answer: No. Any single individual's conceptual understanding of the firm in its
entirety is mainly at an extremely abstract and aggregative level. . . . But these severe
limitations on the knowledge of each participating individual do not imply that the firm does
not know anything very well. For the firm to 'know' a productive technique it is necessary and
sufficient that each individual know his job when the firm is employing the technique. . . . By
far the most important coordinating and organizing force is the invisible interlocking structure
of mutually consistent expectations held by the various members of the organization: each
correctly expects that he will receive familiar signals from the others and will respond in the
familiar ways.").
48. Nicholas Argyres, Evidence on the Role of Firm Capabilities in Vertical Integration
Decisions, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 129, 131 (1996) (citation omitted); see also Liebeskind,
supra note 45.
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organization," and/or ensure that participants avoid transferring
knowledge outside of the firm.so
2. Interconnectedness vs. decomposability
Another type of knowledge problem arises when the information
and resources available to different parties to the enterprise, and the
actions expected of each, are highly fluid and interconnected.
Suppose for example that participants in an enterprise want to
develop and commercialize a new technology, such as the next
generation of gene-sequencing technology. The project will require a
high level of engineering knowledge of existing technology and how
it is used in laboratories, what problems the technology has and
where the bottlenecks are, as well as knowledge of the latest
experimental methods being used in research laboratories at biotech
firms, pharmaceutical firms, and universities. Team members will also
need to be able to project production costs for new machine designs,
and understand something about the potential market for them. No
single member of any team of researchers and technicians is likely to
have all of the necessary knowledge for the project, but team
members hope that working together they might be able to
accomplish the task. It is likely that the work cannot easily be divided
up into pieces that each team member could accomplish in isolation.
In fact, team members might need to interact with each other
repeatedly, with some searching for ways to alter different aspects of
existing technology, others subjecting the new approach to analysis
and trial by the other parties, and other team members figuring out
how to automate the process and engineer the machines so that they
are affordable and reliable."
49. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974); Bruce Kogut & Udo
Zander, Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, and the Replication of Technology, 3
ORG. SCI. 383 (1992); Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, What Do Firms Do? Coordination,
Identity, and Learning, 7 ORG. SC. 502 (1996); Jack A. Nickerson & Todd R. Zenger, A
Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm-The Problem-Solving Perspective, 15 ORG. SCI. 617
(2004).
50. See Kathleen R. Conner & C. K. Prahalad, A Resource-Based Theory of the Firm:
Knowledge Versus Opportunism, 7 ORG. SCI. 477 (1996); Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the
Firm Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 141 (1988); Gonzales-Diaz & Vazquez, supra note 3, at
266 (noting that standard theories argue that firms "use vertical integration to avoid sharing
information about production know-how, customer information, and product or process
design with other firms"); Liebeskind, supra note 45.
51. See Nickerson & Zenger, supra note 49, at 619-20 (referring to the ease or
difficulty with which a search for new knowledge can be broken up into tasks that can be
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The fluidity of the discovery process and the interconnectedness
of team members' findings, as well as the unpredictability of the
sequence of steps required in response to each new finding, might
seem likely to sabotage any attempt to govern such a project by
formal contract.52 If the project is carried out by employees within a
single firm, however, the relationships among participants can be
more loose and fluid because participants can shift the direction of
their efforts as needed without insisting on writing every expectation
or accomplishment down and assigning prices or values to them.
Team leaders can set the direction, monitor assignments, and
determine the compensation for the whole team and for each
member." Development and commercialization of complex
technologies is thus a type of productive activity that, until recently,
was generally thought to be better governed by hierarchy within a
firm rather than across several firms.
Some productive activity, however, may be highly
"decomposable," meaning that steps in the project can be separated
from each other and sequenced, with each one completed or nearly-
completed before it is passed along to become an input into the next
step. One of us has seen an apparel manufacturing facility, for
example, where fabric cutting operations were carried out by one
firm, and the assembly operation carried out by a separate firm. Both
firms, as it happened, operated in the same building, but there was a
accomplished in isolation as the "decomposability" of the project).
52. See Gilson et al., supra note 11, at 459-71 (examining a small collection of contracts
that govern relationships between firms collaborating on new technology development and
suggesting that, in some cases, innovation can be managed by contract, rather than by
hierarchy within a single firm). We say more about the possibility that outsourcing contracts
can enable firms to manage new technology development across firm boundaries in Part IV.B.
and note 126.
53. Teams can be self managed as well, though most approaches to compensating
participants and allocating rents within a self-managed team are fraught with incentive
problems. See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982)
(showing a classic economic model of the incentive problems within self-managed teams); see
also Louis Putterman, On Some Recent Explanations of Why Capital Hires Labor, 22 ECON.
INQUIRY 171 (1986) (discussing major theories about why most firms are not organized as
self-managed teams).
54. Harold Demsetz, Profit as a Functional Return: Reconsidering Knight's Views, in
OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND THE FIRM: THE ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 236-
47 (1988) (arguing, for example, that economic actors organize themselves into firms to
economize on expenditures on communicating and coordinating knowledge, a function at the
heart of innovation). For the most part, however, economic theories of the firm do not directly
address innovation.
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wall separating one firm from the other." When projects can be
broken down into tasks that have little interaction with one another,
production design theorists say that such projects are decomposable
into "modular" tasks. Modularization refers to the process of
breaking apart the various tasks and steps involved in producing
some good or service into units that are well-specified and self-
contained, but that can work effectively with a number of different
other units." Such units can more easily become the basis for
organizing production in markets or by contracts, rather than under
the direction of a hierarchical governance arrangement. From this
perspective, firms help organize production that is not readily
decomposable into productive modules, whereas production that is
decomposable can more readily be organized through markets and
contracts.
Standardization can help to modularize the production process.
For example, modularization is facilitated when the physical
characteristics of products and components as well as information
such as weights, measures, protocols, and programming languages
are "standardized."58  Standardization creates common
understandings about technical and performance characteristics of
products and services that can be observed and measured by
independent third parties for purposes of contract negotiation,
55. One of us (Blair) toured such a facility in the Dominican Republic in the spring of
2006 as part of her duties as a member of the board of directors of WRAP (Worldwide
Responsible Accredited Production), which sets standards for fair and humane production
operations in labor-intensive industries. WRAP officials suspected that both "firms" (the
cutting operation and the assembly operation) were owned and operated by the same parties,
so that the division between them may have been somewhat artificial. The separation served
the function, however, of allowing the cutting operation to be certified as meeting the WRAP
standards without having to solve all of the labor and safety problems in the assembly part of
the operation.
56. See BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 21 ("A module is a unit whose structural
elements are powerfully connected among themselves and relatively weakly connected to
elements in other units.").
57. This hypothesis is in contrast to NELSON & WINTER, supra note 43, who argue
that firms are repositories of "routines." We are suggesting that firms can support activities that
are not at all routine if the participants are willing to yield some control to managers so that
they do not need to stop, measure, and compensate every transfer. See discussion of "transfers"
in contrast to "transactions," infra Part II.B.3.
58. See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 42, at 1146 ("Standardization is the process
through which tacit knowledge is made explicit, formalized, and then codified or instantiated
in physical processes and products." (citation omitted)).
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coordination, and enforcement.' 9 Standardization also makes it easier
for firm participants who carry out one activity or task to interact not
only with other units in the same firm, but with other organizations
outside the firm. Thus it may be possible, or much easier, to
organize standardized approaches to production through markets
and contracts, making hierarchy and fiat relatively less attractive.
3. The role of "complex, interdependent, and iterative transfers"
Professors Carliss Baldwin and Kim Clark of Harvard Business
School formalized the concept of modular production in a treatise
published in 2000,60 and in recent years, Baldwin has explored the
implications of this concept for a theory of the boundaries of firms in
a productive system.6 In all but the simplest production activities,
tasks involved in producing something are not all carried out by a
single individual, Baldwin observes. Thus, she says, "it is necessary to
transfer various things-material, energy, and information-from
agent to agent in a productive system., 62
Baldwin distinguishes such "transfers" from "transactions,"
which are the primary units of analysis under transactions-cost
theories of the firm.63 "Transactions" are a "mutually agreed-upon
set of transfers between two or more parties, with compensatory
payment."" "Transfers," by contrast, can occur in units of any size,
with no formality, no necessary prior agreement among the parties,
no necessary measurement and evaluation, and no compensation.s
Thus the "transactions costs" associated with a simple transfer are
much lower than they would be for a formal "transaction" involving
the same flow of information or materials between the same two
59. See Margaret Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The New Role for Assurance
Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325 (2008) [hereinafter Assurance Services];
Margaret Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The Roles ofStandardization, Certification,
and Assurance Services in GLOBAL COMMERCE, IN CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE CONTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND RELATED
DISCIPLINEs 299 (Lorenzo Sacconi et al. eds., 2010).
60. See BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 21.
61. See Baldwin, supra note 9.
62. Id. at 163.
63. Id. at 164.
64. Id. Baldwin notes that Coase used the phrase "exchange transaction" to mean what
she calls a "transaction," and he used the phrase "internal transaction" to refer to what she
calls a "transfer." Id. (citing Coase, supra note 2, at 393-98).
65. See id. at 164-65.
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individuals. "Tasks" that are carried out as part of a production
process may involve multiple transfers among the parties working on
the task, with information and materials moving back and forth
perhaps many times."6
Baldwin (following Baldwin and Clark) illustrates the structure of
such complex tasks using a "task structure matrix" (TSM).67 A
simple TSM for making and utilizing pot hooks is illustrated in Fig.
1 below.6' The matrix lists all of the individuals involved in making a
pot hook in an ironsmith shop, and in using the pot hook in a
kitchen, down the left side of the grid, and across the top of the grid.
If any two individuals in the grid will have to transfer materials,
energy, information, knowledge, or resources between them, an x is
placed in the off-diagonal square of the grid representing the
interaction of those two individuals. It is assumed that there are five
individuals in the smithy part of the operation (S1-S5), and five in
the kitchen part of the operation (Kl-K5). Those who work
together in the smithy frequently exchange information and
materials as they work, so all of the off-diagonal squares within the
smithy subset of the grid have an x. Similarly for all of the off-
diagonal squares within the kitchen part of the grid. But very few
transfers are necessary or expected between individuals in the smithy
and individuals in the kitchen. Thus there is only one square with an
x (representing an interaction and transfer between S5 and Kl) in
either the upper right quadrant or the lower left quadrant. This x
represents the transfer of the finished pot hook to one of the kitchen
workers, for use in the kitchen.
66. See id. at 162 ("The basic unit in the design of any production process is a task.").
Baldwin also says that "the primitive units of analysis are decisions, components, or tasks," and
"decisions, components, and tasks are more microscopic than stages, but more concrete and
directly observable than knowledge." Id.
67. Similar matrices used to understand complex organizational structures have been
called "design structure system[s]" in Donald V. Steward, The Design Structure System: A
Method for Managing the Design of Complex Systems, 28 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON
ENGINEERING MGMT. 71 (1981), and "design structure matri[ces]" in Steven D. Eppinger,
Model-Based Approaches to Managing Concurrent Engineering, 2 J. ENGINEERING DESIGN
283, 285 (1991).
68. See Baldwin, supra note 9, at 167.
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Figure 1
Task and Transfer Network for a Smithy, a Kitchen and an Iron Pot Hook
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Figure 1 is taken from Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do Transactions
Come From? Modularity, Transactions, and the Boundaries of Firms,
17 INDUSTRIAL & CORPORATE CHANGE 162, 167 (2007) (Figure
1).
In this simple example, we would expect many if not all of the
exchanges among smithy workers to be mere transfers, with no
formalities. And we would similarly expect the exchanges among the
kitchen workers to be informal transfers. In fact, the interactions
among the smithy workers are likely to be frequent, iterative, and
complex, in the sense that the workers interact with each other
frequently and repeatedly.
A "transaction," by contrast, requires the parties to define and
measure the objects being transacted, and for the purchaser to
compensate the supplier. If every transfer at every interaction
between any two smithy workers had to be defined, measured, and
compensated, we can imagine that the process would quickly bog
down under the weight of the associated administrative costs."
But a transaction, in which what is exchanged is defined,
measured, and compensated, makes a great deal of sense for the
exchange between S5 and Kl. In this exchange, S5 delivers to K1
the completed pot hook, and K1 pays S5 for the pot hook.70 The
69. Baldwin refers to the costs of defining, measuring, and compensating a transfer as
"mundane transactions costs." Id. at 164.
70. See id. at 167.
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task of delivering the finished pot hook to its purchaser is not
complex or iterative because it is a one-off transfer, and it is relatively
easy to define what is being transferred (one pot hook), to measure it
(including its size, weight, and performance characteristics), and to
compensate the smithy for the pot hook with money.7' No other
interaction is required between individuals in the smithy and
individuals in the kitchen.
So in this simple example, it makes sense to locate a transaction
at the nexus between S5 and KI, but it probably would not make
sense to locate transactions anywhere else in the task structure
matrix.
It is not hard to imagine that a task structure matrix constructed
to map out all of the interactions among participants in a project to
develop and market a new technology, such as a new drug for
treating schizophrenia, would be huge, with areas that are extremely
complex and dense (e.g., the interactions among the biochemists,
neurologists, and the lab technicians in the laboratory), and other
areas that are less dense and complex (the interactions between the
neurologists on the research team and the package designers in the
marketing department). Baldwin notes that a goal of organizational
design is to figure out where in a map of all the transfers it might
make sense to construct organizational boundaries, at the edge of
which all transfers are "transactions," and where this would not make
sense. 72 This, of course, is exactly what is happening when a firm
decides to outsource some activity-it is deciding to construct a new
organizational boundary, after which subsequent transfers across that
boundary will be converted into "transactions."
The plotting of tasks in a task structure matrix helps illustrate the
notion of modularity discussed above. In a task structure matrix,
modules appear as densely connected blocks, such as the block of x's
indicating interactions among workers in the smithy. If there are
only a few, simple out-of-block transfers in such a matrix, then the
underlying network is highly modular. In many productive
enterprises, however, the tasks and transfers do not have such natural
break points. Wherever there are extensive out-of-block transfers, the
production process is inherently less modular. Places on the matrix
where the interaction between blocks involves only one or a few
71. Id. at 167-68.
72. Id. at 165.
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transfers are referred to as "thin crossing points," whereas places
where the interaction involves many participants and transfers are
called "thick crossing points.""
The simple insight Baldwin takes from this way of describing
production technology is that transactions-in which what is being
transferred must be identified, measured, and compensated-should
take place at "thin" crossing points.74 Interactions at thick crossing
points, however, should be managed by a process that suppresses the
need to specifically identify, measure, and compensate every transfer,
because at these junctures, the cost of identifying, measuring and
compensating is too high." Instead, Baldwin argues, such transfers
should be located in what she calls "transaction-free zones,"" such
as within a firm, where exchanges and interactions are governed by a
hierarchy.
Thus the modularity theory of the firm is that firms exist to
govern the dense and complex transfers involved in activities and
projects that cannot be reduced to modules. This theory is obviously
consistent with, and linked to, the economic literature on theory of
the firm that builds on Coasian and Williamsonian theories of
choosing governance structure to minimize transactions costs. 77
Baldwin, however, distinguishes the work that goes into defining,
measuring, compensating, and otherwise specifying the terms of
transactions, which she calls "mundane transaction costs," from the
"opportunistic transaction costs" that economists have emphasized.
In her theory, tasks and transfers are connected in a network, and are
characterized by how the people involved in production must
interact in their daily effort to get a job done collectively, rather than
by how information and incentives can be manipulated to get
participants to do their jobs.79
Baldwin's analysis suggests that transaction costs will be kept to a
minimum if the boundaries of firms are at thin crossing points,
73. Id. at 172. "At thin crossing points between modules, there are, by definition, fewer
and simpler transfers than within modules. Mundane transactions costs will thus be low at thin
crossing points." Id. at 166.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 171.
76. Id. at 180.
77. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
78. See Baldwin, supra note 9, at 166, 171.
79. See id. at 163.
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where exchanges can be structured as transactions and governed
either by simple market exchanges or by formal contracts in which
what is being exchanged can be readily identified, measured, and
compensated." This analysis seems intuitively useful to us, and we
believe it helps us explain features of the outsourcing contracts we
observe. In particular, we will identify a number of features of
outsourcing contracts that we think can be interpreted as
mechanisms for reducing the density of interactions at "crossing
points," while other features seem to be designed to standardize
aspects of managing interactions at crossing points that will continue
to be thick, despite taking place across firm boundaries.
4. Implicationsfor outsourcing contracts
Outsourcing contracts are devices for creating a firm "boundary"
between activities that had formerly been carried out within a firm. If
the modularity theory of the boundaries of the firm is correct, it
predicts that contractual governance should be used instead of
hierarchical governance only at places in the production process that
are, or can be made to be, "thin crossing points." These are places
where "transfers" between parties involved in production can be
identified, measured, and compensated"-in other words, places
where transfers between parties can become "transactions." 8 2
If this is correct, we should find evidence in the contracts we
examine that firms have figured out how to reduce the degree of
interconnectedness among different phases of production in order to
reduce the thickness of the crossing points at the place where the
new boundary has been located. We will discuss several ways we
think this might be happening below.
But reducing the thickness of the crossing points may be only
part of the story. The other part of the story, we suspect, has to do
with finding contractual mechanisms for reducing the "mundane"
costs of transactions-the costs of identifying, measuring, and
compensating-even at thick crossing points, and thereby reducing
the vulnerability that a party faces when transacting at these thicker
points. Mechanisms for reducing mundane transactions costs include
devices for standardizing the processes for identifying, measuring,
80. See id. at 165.
81. See id. at 156.
82. See id.
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and compensating what is being transacted. The more the features of
a task can be standardized, it seems to us, the lower the cost of
identification, measurement, and compensation, and the easier it is
for the task to be carried out by one party and then delivered to the
next party in the production chain in a simple transaction. Fully
modularized activities or tasks tend to be highly standardized and
separable from other tasks in a production chain, and as such, can
more easily be governed by relatively simple contracts. Even partially
standardized terms can help to reduce transactions costs.
The parties to transactions at thick crossing points also face
vulnerability stemming from the fact that each ends up enmeshed in
the business of the other. To be sure, this enmeshment can help to
harmonize the parties' interests," but to the extent those interests
continue to diverge, the thicker crossing points leave each party
especially vulnerable to the opportunistic behaviors of the other."
This problem is intensified at thick crossing points precisely because
by definition the terms of the parties' transaction cannot be fully
specified. Contracts at thick crossing points, it seems to us, must
include provisions that attempt to reduce transactional vulnerability.
This analysis helps us formulate several hypotheses about what
outsourcing contracts must accomplish to be able to effectively
govern a set of activities that had previously been governed by
hierarchy:
1) The contracts must create "thin crossing points" by reducing
the number of individuals who must interact with each other, and
the frequency of interaction, in transferring things across the new
firm boundaries. In other words, at least the significant events of
contract, including negotiation, modification, dispute resolution,
and termination, need to be made easier through the creation of
thin crossing points.
83. This seems to be the argument that Gilson et al., supra note 11, at 459-71, are
making in their discussion of contracts that govern agreements between firms to co-develop
new technologies.
84. If two steps to a joint production process are interdependent, as we would expect at
a thick crossing point, each is specific to the other. Such interdependency, Baldwin observes, is
a form of "Williamsonian asset specificity." See Baldwin, supra note 9, at 170 (citing OLIVER
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985)). Investment in specific
assets by parties to a business has been recognized as one of the factors that can lead business
organizers to vertically integrate the steps within the same firm. See supra notes 17-20 and
accompanying text for citations to literature linking specific assets to vertical integration.
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2) The contracts must attempt to specify in advance, in some detail,
what it is that will be transferred at each crossing point.
3) The contracts must specify how those things will be measured.
4) The contracts must specify how those things will be
compensated.
5) The contracts must invoke, or arrange for developing,
standardized methods for identifying, measuring, and
compensating.
6) Because the contracts are supposed to govern activities that were
formerly subject to hierarchical decision-making, they must have
some sort of mechanism for resolving misunderstandings or
disputes that will inevitably arise as the parties attempt to identify,
measure, and compensate transactions in goods, ideas, and services
that were previously transferred informally.
7) The contracts must incorporate provisions designed to reduce
the vulnerability of the parties. In particular, both the firm that
chooses to outsource its production or services and the service
provider must find ways to either control or minimize the costs of
adverse actions of the other party, given their enmeshment.
III. OUTSOURCING CONTRACTS AND THEIR ROLE IN CROSSING-
POINT MANAGEMENT
A. Our Contracts
For use in this research project, the Chicago office of Kirkland &
Ellis LLP gave us access to a small collection of outsourcing
contracts with identifying information about the parties redacted to
maintain confidentiality of the clients. These contracts were all
drafted and/or negotiated by Kirkland & Ellis on behalf of the
parties in the last nine years. All involved sizeable corporations that
were arranging for substantial information technology, records
management, manufacturing activities, software writing activities, or
call center activity that the "Customer" corporation had previously
handled internally to be done by an outside "Service Provider"
organization, usually using personnel and facilities located in other
countries. Kirkland & Ellis provided us with nine actual contracts,
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plus several contract forms, appendices and amendments to
contracts, and hundreds of other related documents."s
For this paper, we have summarized and categorized provisions
of seven outsourcing contracts. Five of these were for information
technology services (including call centers, data management, and
human resources management services), one was for a software
writing project, and one was for manufacturing services. The shortest
contract was 56 pages; the longest was a 77-page contract that
included 14 exhibits, detailed in another 157 pages, for a total of
234 pages. The individual contracts and contracting parties are
described in the Appendix in general terms. In this paper, each
contract is referred to by a reference number created by the authors.
B. Thick and Thin Crossing Points
Many of the outsourcing contract terms we observed seemed
designed to either thin a crossing point or to manage the fact that
outsourcing contracts ultimately require that transactions occur at
relatively thick crossing points. We discuss here a few of the contract
provisions that (1) help to create thin crossing points; (2) attempt to
either specify the terms of the parties' exchange or standardize the
many procedures under which the relationship will be conducted
(and accordingly to both thin the crossing points and help manage
the fact that the crossing points remain relatively thick); and (3)
attempt to reduce the vulnerability of the parties, given the
impossibility of fully specifying the terms of their interactions.
1. Creating thin crossing points
Several features of the contracts that we examine can be
interpreted, we believe, as mechanisms for thinning out the crossing
points. In this first section, we focus on mechanisms adopted by the
parties to thin the crossing points for significant events in the life of a
contract, including negotiation and drafting, contract modification,
and dispute resolution and termination.
85. Kirkland & Ellis gave us access to copies of nine actual contracts, a "form" for a
Master Services Agreement, a data transfer agreement, and a contract order for services, as well
as a large collection of supporting documents, memos and presentations to clients on drafting
outsourcing contracts, and professional articles. In this article, we focus on seven of the actual
contracts, although our discussion of these is informed by some of the other materials, and by
Mr. Kirchhoefer's direct experience in negotiating the contracts. The seven contracts are
described in the Appendix. All materials remain on file with the authors.
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a. "Master Agreement" plus "Statement of Work" structure. The
most obvious way that the seven outsourcing contracts we examined
for this project facilitate a "thinning" of the crossing points is that
the contracts themselves are structured in modules. Each document
we examined is a "Master Agreement" designed to govern the
overall relationship between the parties by defining a set of
procedural and default rules that are to apply to a set of sub-
agreements (variously referred to as "Statements of Work," "Work
Agreements," or "Order Documents") negotiated under the overall
agreement. The Master Agreements do not specify any actual
deliverables. Instead they establish a common set of definitions,
principles, guidelines, and processes by which supplemental
agreements about specific deliverables are supposed to operate.
Under the terms of the Master Agreement, these supplemental
agreements describe work projects or activities in detail, specifying
deliverables, time frames, standards for quality and functionality,
control and decision rights, personnel, pricing schedules, and other
details. Thus the work associated with the Agreement is divided into
units or components, with the Master Agreement providing a
common interface between the Customer and the Service Provider
for each project.
Importantly, the individuals representing each party in the
negotiation and drafting of the Master Agreement differ from those
representing each party in the negotiation and drafting of a
Statement of Work. Lawyers draft the general rules of the parties'
relationship in the former, but the Statements of Work are drafted by
individuals embedded within each firm with detailed knowledge of
the specific work to be performed. By breaking the negotiation of
the contract into modules, fewer individuals' input is needed at each
stage, and contract details may be more effectively specified. In
addition, the Master Agreement can continue to remain in force for
the parties as new Statements of Work are formed and old ones are
modified, completed, or cancelled. The modularized structure of the
contracts therefore contributes to both the flexibility and the
continuity of the relationship.
Although the details of the Statements of Work are not
necessarily standardized, Master Agreement provisions appear to be
designed to reduce interdependencies among the various projects.
For example, the Master Agreements include provisions that help
keep problems and disputes that arise under one Statement of Work
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contained, so that they do not spill over into the work being done
under another Statement of Work. One way the Master Agreements
do this is by providing that both the Master Agreement and any
Statement of Work will continue to be in effect even if some other
Statement of Work is terminated. For example, in Document 1.1.B,
a section entitled "Termination of Statements of Work" provides
that "[u]nless otherwise provided in this Agreement or the applicable
Statement of Work, expiration or termination of such Statement of
Work shall not terminate any other Statement of Work or this
Agreement."8 6 Similar provisions appear in all of the seven contracts
we examined."
The contracts also provide that the Service Provider must
continue to perform the work associated with a given Statement of
Work even if funds are being withheld by the Customer over a
dispute about proper charges for work performed under a separate
Statement of Work.8 ' Thus, despite the expectation of a long term,
multifaceted relationship between that Customer and the Service
Provider, the contract attempts to divide up work to be done into
functional or task-related modules and limit interaction among
different modules.89
b. Identifying a small number of key personnel as decision-makers.
All of the contracts we reviewed provide that each party to the
agreement is to designate certain individuals to serve as the primary
decision-makers for their side, at least with respect to some aspects of
the overall relationship.90 Document 1.2 provides, for example, that
each party should designate a "Project Manager" for the Master
Agreement, as well as Project Managers for each Statement of Work,
and further provides that only these Project Managers have the
authority to bind the corresponding party in determining whether
86. Doc. 1.1.B § 3.2, at 4.
87. Doc. 1.1.C § 3.2, at 4; Doc. 1.2 § 2.1, at 8; Doc. 1.3 § 4.2, at 13; Doc. 2.4§ 16.2(a), at 40; Doc. 2.5 § 3.2, at 11; Doc. 2.6 § 35.2, at 49.
88. Doc. 1.1.B §24.1.1,at45;Doc. 1.2 § 22.1,at43; Doc 2 .5 § 21.6,at52.
89. In several of the contracts, work is further subdivided within Statements of Work
into "Service Towers," defined, for example, in Document 1.C. ex. 1, Defined Terms, at 9,
as "a specified class of Services identified in a Statement of Work as a separate category of
Services that is related to, but distinct from, other Services provided under such Statement of
Work."
90. Doc. 1.1.B § 13.1, at 18-19; Doc. 1.1.C § 13.1, at 21; Doc. 1.2 § 2.4, at 9; Doc.
1.3 § 2.2.1, app.12, at 4; Doc. 2.4 § 5.8(a), at 18; Doc. 2.5 § 17.2, at 26; Doc. 2.6 § 3.1, at
6.
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work is being done adequately, in signing any change orders, and in
resolving disputes.9 ' Similarly, Document 2.4 provides that each
party will "designate a qualified employee of such Party to act as the
primary liaison with the other Party regarding this Agreement and all
Supplements." 92
Depending on the nature of the work to be done by the Service
Provider under any particular Agreement or Statement of Work, this
structure may allow frequent and extensive interaction and transfers
of material or information among rank and file individuals working
on the project, but transactions between the corporations are
recognized only when the respective Project Managers have
approved or signed off.
Disputes that may arise in the course of the relationship are
similarly channeled into thin crossing points through dispute
resolution provisions that call for disputes to be resolved, if possible,
by mutual agreement between identified project-level managers
representing each party. If not resolved at that level, disputes are to
escalate up a pre-determined hierarchy of manager pairs (one
representing each party) to representatives of senior management in
both companies. The Agreements also provide that no dispute may
be the "subject of any court action" before going through the
escalation procedure laid out in the contract.93
2. Specification or standardization of terms and procedures
Many provisions of these very detailed contracts are devoted to
specifying what is to be exchanged and how the parties are expected
to behave over the course of the relationship. The Master Agreement
attempts to specify the general structure of the relationship, while
the Statements of Work focus on aspects of the specific services. As
mentioned earlier, specification and standardization help to
modularize the contracting process. Here we discuss a few ways that
the Master Agreements help to specify or standardize terms and
procedures. These contract features serve to both thin the crossing
points of the transaction and help manage the fact that the crossing
91. Doc. 1.2 § 2.4, at 9.
92. Doc. 2.4 § 2.2(a), at 6.
93. Exceptions are provided for urgent matters where some sort of equitable relief, such
as an injunction, is required to prevent leaks of confidential information or another event that
might cause irreversible damage.
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points are ultimately thicker than those observed in standard market
exchanges.
a. Invoking or developing standardized metrics. An important
mechanism for thinning the crossing points involves the
development and use of standardized metrics for measuring
performance. Three of the contracts, for example, had the following
provision: "Service Provider shall implement at its expense,
Measurement and Monitoring Tools ... [to] permit reporting to
Customer at a level of detail sufficient to verify compliance with the
Service Levels and shall be subject to audit by Customer."9 4
All seven of the Agreements referred to external standards such
as ISO 9000" series standards or the Information Technology
Infrastructure Library (ITIL)96 best practice standards, or the
Software Engineering Institute (SEI) Capability Maturity Model
(CMM) standards.9 7 We also saw provisions that established a set of
standards or metrics to be agreed to between the parties, sometimes
called "Service Levels," by which the Service Provider's performance
would be judged. Document 1.3, for example, defines Service Levels
as "standards for performance, availability, reliability, quality,
customer service, capacity, speed, timeliness, conformity, efficiency,
94. Doc. 1.1.B § 8.3, at 10; Doc. 1.1.C § 8.3, at 11; Doc. 1.3 § 8.3, at 19.
95. See, e.g., Doc. 2.6 § 13.2, at 18 ("Service Provider shall maintain a quality
management system (QMS) registered with a recognized third-party registration authority that
covers the locations and scope of the Services provided to Large Customer. . . . Such QMS
must conform to the specific requirements of ISO 9001:2000 . . . ."); see also ISO 9000,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_9000 (last visited Mar. 25, 2011) ("The ISO
9000 family of standards relate [sic] to quality management systems and are designed to help
organizations ensure they meet the needs of customers and other stakeholders. The standards
are published by ISO, the International Organization for Standardization and available
through [n]ational standards bodies.").
96. See Information Technology Infrastructure Library, WIKIPEDIA, http://
en.wikipedia.org/viki/InformationTechnology InfrastructureLibrary (last visited Mar. 25,
2011) ("ITIL gives detailed descriptions of a number of important IT practices and provides
comprehensive checklists, tasks and procedures that any IT organisation can tailor to its needs.
ITIL is published in a series of books, each of which covers an IT management topic.").
97. Doc. 1.1.B § 8.1, at 10; Doc. 1.1.C § 8.1, at 10; Doc. 1.2 § 2.6.1, at 10; Doc. 1.3§ 8.1, at 18; Doc. 2.4 § 3.6, at 11; Doc. 2.5 § 8.1, at 17; Doc. 2.6 § 22.1, at 29; see also
Capability Maturity Model, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability Maturity-
Model (last visited Mar. 25, 2011) ("The Capability Maturity Model (CMM) is a service mark
owned by Carnegie Mellon University and refers to a development model that was created
after study of data collected from organizations that contracted with the U.S. Department of
Defense, who funded the research. This became the foundation from which CMU created the
Software Engineering Institute (SEI).").
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effectiveness and responsiveness that Service Provider shall be
required to meet," and devotes an appendix to explaining the
"Service Level Methodology" by which performance in these
dimensions are to be evaluated.9 8 The individual Statements of Work
under these Agreements provide further details about the Service
Levels that apply to each separate body of work.
This effort to define and measure the objects of exchange
between the contracting parties facilitates the process of transacting
over, rather than just transferring, each object. Once metrics have
been specified for measuring performance along the many relevant
dimensions, this may reduce the need for agents of the Customer to
supervise the Service Provider closely and continuously. Instead, the
Service Provider is asked to measure its own performance using
metrics it devises (or devises jointly with the Customer), and to
prepare and provide reports to the Customer at regular intervals,
such as monthly or quarterly." This, it seems likely, makes it possible
to reduce the intensity and frequency of required interactions
between Customer and Service Provider over the particular products
or services that are the object of the transaction.
b. Codification of processes. A substantial number of provisions in
these contracts call for extensive codification of one sort or another.
Most of the contracts require the Service Provider to put together a
Transition Plan, for example, which details in advance how it would
go about taking over work that the Customer had been doing for
itself prior to signing the contract.oo One contract required the
Service Provider to develop a detailed Service Procedure Manual
"that describes how Service Provider shall perform and deliver the
Services under this Agreement." 10' This same contract also provides
that a "Governance and Operations Manual" will be prepared and
includes an appendix that details a "governance operating model"
with "four components": governance organization and staffing;
decision-making; governance processes; and standard reporting and
tools.' 02
98. Doc. 1.3, app. 11, at 10.
99. Doc. 1.1.B 8.3, at 10; Doc. 1.1.C § 8.3, at 11; Doc. 1.2 § 2.7, at 11; Doc. 1.3
6 8.3, at 19; Doc. 2.4 § 3.66, at 11; Doc. 2.5 § 8.3, at 17.
100. Doc. 1.1.B § 2.4, at 2; Doc. 1.3 § 2.6, at 3; Doc. 2.4 § 3.2, at 7; Doc. 2.5 § 2.3, at
10; Doc. 2.6 § 12.1, at 16.
101. Doc. 1.3, at 11.
102. Document 1.3 was the longest contract, with the most elaborate and detailed
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Every contract that we looked at provides a procedure by which
changes may be made to the services to be performed, or to the
prices to be charged, during the term of any Statement of Work.'"o
In Document 1.2, for example, Sec. 3 is devoted to "Change
Management," providing that each party may request changes to the
work to be done under any Statement of Work. Once a change has
been proposed, the Service Provider then reports to the Customer
regarding any corresponding adjustments it believes should be made
to the fee schedule, and further provides that "Parties shall negotiate
in good faith a reasonable and equitable adjustment in each or any of
the applicable fees, Deliverables, Services, Schedule, Milestones or
Specifications. "'0
All seven of the contracts we looked at provided that Service
Provider must draw up detailed plans in advance for what would
happen in the event of a disaster or force majeure that caused the
Service Provider to be unable for some period of time to carry out its
responsibilities under the agreement.' These so-called "business
continuity plans" are required to include some redundancy or
backup of business in event of crisis. All seven contracts we examined
appendices. Appendix 12 of the contract is devoted to governance and describes the
"objectives of governance" as to
(a) provide a set of principles, guidelines and process for the management of the
relationship between the Parties and the performance of their respective obligations
under this Agreement; (b) provide for the provision and receipt of the Services in
accordance with this Agreement; (c) communicate on an ongoing basis regarding
the purpose and scope of the Parties' relationship pursuant to this Agreement and
key Agreement terms and milestones; (d) clarify the decision-making rights,
obligations, accountabilities, roles and responsibilities between the Parties; (e)
monitor the SP's compliance with the terms of this Agreement and the Customer
Policies and Procedures; (f) provide for centralized governance of this Agreement
such that all issues or exceptions arising in connection with the performance of the
Services can be effectively and efficiently resolved; and (g) mitigate risks during the
term of this Agreement and the associated Termination Assistance Services period
that would impact this Agreement and the Parties' relationship.
Doc. 1.3, app. 12, at 1-2. The staffing structure of the relationship under this contract is also
routinized and codified to a high degree, with numerous positions specified such as "Customer
Service Tower Lead/Executive" and "Service Provider Service Tower Service Delivery
Manager." Doc. 1.3, app. 12, at 7-8. To an outside observer, the level of detail in the contract
seems cumbersome. In fact, it appears to try to emulate and specify what would be default
arrangements of governance within a single firm.
103. Doc. 1.1.B § 5.3, at 6; Doc 1.1.C § 5.3, at 6; Doc. 1.2 § 3.1, at 12; Doc. 1.3 §
10.1, at 20; Doc. 2.4 § 3.3, at 8; Doc. 2.5 § 5.1, at 13; Doc. 2.6 § 11.1, at 13.
104. Doc. 1.2 § 3, at 12.
105. Doc. 1.1.B § 9.1, at 11; Doc. 1.1.C § 9.1, at 12; Doc. 1.2 § 19.4, at 40; Doc. 1.3§ 20.5.2, at 52; Doc. 2.4 § 17.6, at 45; Doc. 2.5 § 13.1, at 21; Doc. 2.6 § 23, at 30.
296
HeinOnline  -- 2011 BYU L. Rev. 296 2011
Outsourcing, Modularity, and the Theory of the Firm
also provide for the Customer to have priority rights relative to other
customers of the service provider in the event of broad-based
failure.106
c. Periodic (rather than continuous) evaluation of performance
against standards. Most of the contracts we looked at provided for
several different approaches to evaluating performance. Development
of "Service Levels," discussed above, is one approach. Another
approach referred to in the Agreements is a process called
"Acceptance" by which the Customer determines whether work
completed by the Service Provider is satisfactory. Document 1.2
defines "Acceptance Testing" as "(i) testing or review, and (ii)
approval of Deliverables performed by Customer (whether with or
without the participation of Service Provider) in accordance with the
requirements of a specific Statement of Work to determine whether
the applicable Deliverables comply with the Specifications and
requirements set forth in this Agreement and such Standard of
Work." 07 The "Acceptance" process formalizes that the deliverable
has been transferred to the Customer and is satisfactory. Once
compensation is paid to the Service Provider, the transaction is
complete. In this way, the Customer does not monitor the Service
Provider continuously, but only examines and tests the completed
tasks. But the fact that acceptance testing occurs at various phases of
the project is designed to give the Customer some assurance that the
work performed under the contract is proceeding forward at an
acceptable pace and quality.
Some of the contracts provide for periodic "benchmarking," in
which the Customer hires a third party knowledgeable in the
industry to review the package of services that the Service Provider is
providing, the quality and performance levels of the services, and the
structure of pricing for the services.' The "Benchmarker" then
prepares a report that compares the package with what the
Benchmarker believes other service providers are doing, at what
prices, for similarly-situated customers. Of the contracts we reviewed,
Document 1.3 provided the most detail about the benchmarking
process. Appendix 7 to this document provides that "Customer,
106. Doc. 1.1.B § 9.1, at 11; Doc. 1.1.C § 9.2, at 13; Doc. 1.2 § 19.14, at 40; Doc. 1.3
§ 20.5.2, at 52; Doc. 2.4 § 17.7, at 40; Doc. 2.5 § 13.1, at 21; Doc. 2.6 § 23, at 30.
107. Doc. 1.2 § 1, at 1-2.
108. Doc. 1.L.B § 19.2, at 35; Doc. L.1.C § 19.2, at 37-38, Doc. 1.3 § 9, at 20.
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Service Provider and Benchmarker are to agree on the methodology
that will be used to conduct or support the specific Benchmarking
Process and the normalization processes that will be applied."" The
Benchmarker is to compare the Service Provider's performance in
delivering the services to the performance of a panel of comparable
service providers, and Service Provider is required "to bring its
Charges within the top quartile" of the representative sample
("viewed from the perspective most beneficial to the Customer"). 10
Under this Agreement, the Customer has the right "to benchmark
any one or more Service Towers or any one or more components of
the Services within a Service Tower" at least once each year, and if
the benchmarking process indicates that the Customer is not getting
a deal that places it in the top quartile of the control group, the
Agreement provides grounds for the Customer to terminate the
relevant services with 90 days' notice (subject to payment of
termination charges).' The contracts also all provide that the
Service Providers would be subject to various financial, operational,
security, and data management audits, usually at least once per
year. 112
Benchmarking and auditing provide ways for the Customer to
apply a standardized measure of performance at periodic intervals
without continuously monitoring the performance of the Service
Provider. But they also serve to reduce the vulnerability of the
Customer, which wants assurance that the Service Provider continues
to deliver value to it.
3. Management of thick crossing points
While some features of the contracts seem designed to reduce
the interdependencies between stages of production and the required
interactions between agents of the two parties, others seem to
anticipate that the parties will nonetheless be extensively enmeshed
in one another's business. Other features in the contracts provide
mechanisms for managing that interface. We focus here on at least
two categories of contract terms that seem to be about managing the
109. Doc. 1.3 § 35, app. 7, at 2.
110. Doc. 1.3 § 6.2, at 4.
111. Doc. 1.3 § 3.1, app. 7, at 1.
112. Doc. 1.1.B § 11.2, at 13-14; Doc. 1.1.C § 11.2, at 15-16; Doc. 1.2 § 10, at 27-
28; Doc. 1.3 § 6.5, at 15; Doc. 2.4 § 5.7, at 17-18; Doc. 2.5 § 20, at 34-35; Doc. 2.6 § 19.2,
at 26.
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relationship at what Baldwin would probably call a "thick crossing
point": control rights and termination provisions.
a. Customer control over Service Provider personnel. Every contract
we examined gave substantial control rights to the Customer over
personnel decisions by the Service Provider. A typical clause provides
that both parties are to designate individuals who are considered
"Key Personnel," and that "Service Provider shall not reassign or
remove any such Key Personnel for eighteen (18) months from the
date that such person is designated as Key Personnel, without prior
express consent of Customer."13 In every contract, the Customer
was given the right to ask the Service Provider to remove an
individual from the project along with the right of refusal for any
new individuals the Service Provider wants to assign to the
account." 4 Several of the contracts provided that the Customer
could give directions to Service Provider personnel. Document 1.1 .B
was quite specific about this, providing that Customer could deploy
its own employees to "assist in, or oversee, the provision of the
Services," and could issue instructions to Service Provider employees
regarding "choice of methodology or approach to providing the
Services ... instructions concerning compliance with applicable
Laws ... [and] instructions concerning processing of Customer
Personal Data."" 5
These provisions highlight the fact that the outsourcing
relationship is something of a hybrid-formally governed by
contract, but with characteristics such as customer control over
personnel and process decisions that theorists have associated with
within-firm governance. Each of the contracts, however, included
very specific provisions to the effect that employees of the Service
Provider are not in any way to be regarded as employees of the
Customer."' Document 1.2, for example, provides that:
Service Provider and Customer are not joint employers, a single
employer, associated employers or related employers for any
113. Doc. 1.3, at 22.
114. Doc. 2.4, at 15, for example, provides that if Customer objects to some employee
being assigned as "Key Personnel," then "Supplier will not assign the individual to that
position."
115. Doc. 1.1.B 13.7.1, at 21.
116. Doc. 1.1.A § 4.3, at 4; Doc. 1.1.B § 4.3, at 5; Doc. 1.1.C § 4.3, at 5; Doc. 1.2
§ 4.8, at 15; Doc. 1.3 § 3.3, at 12; Doc. 2.4 § 4.2, at 14; Doc. 2.5 § 4.2, at 12; Doc. 2.6 §
20.3, at 27; Doc. 2.7 § 5.2, at 15.
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purposes under this Agreement or otherwise .... [and] Service
Provider shall require all Personnel to sign an agreement in a form
designated by Customer under which such Personnel shall (i)
affirm they are not employees of Customer for any purpose and
that they shall not exercise any right or seek any benefit accruing to
117the regular employees of Customer ....
b. Termination provisions. All of the contracts that we examined
significantly limit the right of the Supplier or Service Provider to
terminate the contract."' The limits on termination seem to be
designed to protect the Customer once the Customer gives up its in-
house capability to carry out the work itself and becomes dependent
upon the Service Provider for those services. Document 1.3, for
example, provides that the Customer may terminate the agreement
for convenience after the agreement has been in effect for as little as
one year, but must provide 180 days' notice and pay a termination
charge."' The Service Provider, by contrast, may not terminate for
convenience for at least ten years, and then must still provide 180
days' notice.120 Moreover, even if the Service Provider terminates the
agreement for convenience according to the contract, it may still not
terminate any Work Agreement that is still in effect, and the Master
Agreement continues to apply to those Work Agreements until they
are no longer in effect.121
If the Customer terminates for convenience, it must pay a
termination charge, but if the Service Provider terminates for
convenience, the contract provides that the Customer may "hire
those employees of Service Provider and Service Provider's affiliates
who were substantially dedicated to providing the Services [and]
who wish to be hired" and "take assignment of contracts and licenses
used and entered into exclusively to provide the Services."1 22
Document 2.6 is even more restrictive for the Service Provider.
While the contract provides a long list of reasons why Customer may
terminate for cause (breach, unsuccessful Implementation Plan,
117. Doc. 1.2, at 15.
118. Doc. 1.1.B § 24.2, at 46; Doc 1.1.C § 24.2, at 48; Doc. 1.2 §§ 11.4, 11.6, at 28;
Doc. 1.3 § 23.2, at 66; Doc. 2.4 § 16.3, at 41; Doc. 2.5 § 28.5, at 51; Doc. 2.6 § 36.3(a), at
51.
119. Doc. 1.3 § 23.1.1, at 55.
120. Id. § 23.2.1, at 60.
121. Doc. 1.3, at 55.
122. Doc. 1.3, at 62.
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failure of Critical Service Level Event, Service Provider liability
exceeding some cap, change of control, bankruptcy or insolvency, or
occurrence of a force majeure event in which Service Provider is
unable to restore service quickly enough), the contract provides that
Service Provider may terminate for cause only if Customer is more
than 90 days late in paying, has been notified that it is late, has been
given 60 more days to pay after such notice, and the Service Provider
has exhausted the internal dispute resolution process.' 2 3 Service
Provider may not terminate for cause for any other reason.
All seven of the contracts also provide that, upon termination,
regardless of the reason for termination, Service Provider will be
required to provide "termination assistance" for up to six months.'
Termination assistance may include training the customer's own
personnel to do the work, or even training the personnel of a new
service provider hired to carry out the services.12
These contractual features may simply be evidence that the
Customers in the contracts we examined have substantial market
power relative to the Service Provider. But some of the service
providers in the contracts we reviewed are large, well-established,
U.S.-based corporations that did not have to accept stringent terms
to get the business. Thus we are inclined to believe that the
termination assistance provisions reflect a need on the part of the
outsourcing corporation to manage and mitigate the effect of the
fact that it will become dependent upon the service provider to carry
out activities that are critical to its business.
IV. OBSERVATIONS AND COMPARISONS
A. Outsourcing Contracts and Transactions Costs
Outsourcing could prove beneficial to firms for many reasons.
Some firms hope to evade regulatory burdens, some hope to capture
the gains from economies of scale that specialized service providers
might be able to achieve in the provision of specific services, and still
others simply want to reduce the costs of doing business by
outsourcing work to a firm that knows the local government and
123. Doc. 2.6, at 49-53.
124. Doc. 1.1.B § 24.11, at 48; Doc. 1.1.C § 24.11, at 50; Doc. 1.2 § 11.8, at 29; Doc.
1.3 § 23.4, at 61-62; Doc. 2.4 § 16.5(b), at 41; Doc. 2.5 § 28.6, at 52; Doc. 2.6 § 36.7, at
53.
125. Doc. 1.1.B § 24.11, at 48; Doc. 2.5 § 28.6, at 52; Doc. 2.6 § 36.7, at 53.
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markets better. Whatever their reasons for wanting to outsource
some activity, customer and supplier firms must be able to deploy
fairly sophisticated contracting technology in order to manage the
complex relationships that result when new boundaries between
firms are inserted in places that had been "thick crossing points"
within a single firm.
The contracting technology that we see in evidence in the seven
contracts we examined has evolved substantially over time, and
continues to evolve. As this technology improves, and as more firms
gain experience with the types of arrangements discussed above, this
may facilitate further growth in outsourcing. While this evolution in
contracting technology might not be the primary explanation for the
growth in outsourcing in recent decades, we suspect that
outsourcing has increased in part because newly outsourcing firms
are able to replicate and improve on governance arrangements that
have been used by pioneers. Thus, contracting technology influences
the practice of outsourcing at the margin and therefore warrants
further understanding.
We hypothesize that the contract terms we have examined in this
article can be understood as arrangements that help to reduce the
"mundane" transactions costs-the costs of identifying, measuring,
and compensating what is being transferred-as well as the
opportunistic transactions costs that have been the focus of other
studies.'26 We suspect that much of the benefit of outsourcing
contracts lies in the development and use of terms that reduce such
mundane contracting costs by, say, developing standardized
language and measurement tools. Such tools not only facilitate the
day-to-day interaction between the parties to the outsourcing
contract but also serve to "modularize" the activity, and thereby lay
the groundwork for governing a contracting relationship with
another contractual party on another activity down the road.
126. See Outsourcing Transactions, supra note 10 (focusing on the way that outsourcing
contracts reduce agency costs); Gilson et al., supra note 11 (focusing on the special contracting
problems that arise when firms attempt to outsource innovation and arguing that practices that
increase the "switching costs" for parties to such arrangements have the effect of counteracting
incentives to defect and facilitating cooperative behavior by locking the parties ever more
tightly into the relationship). Gilson et al. appear to be comparing the cost of staying in the
relationship with the contractual party to the cost associated with switching to a new
contractual partner, rather than comparing that cost to the cost of keeping the activity in-
house.
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B. Generalizing Crossing-Point Management in Outsourcing
Although we derived our hypotheses about outsourcing
contracts after looking at the sample of contracts we describe in this
paper, the small number of contracts and the single law firm involved
in negotiating each of them severely limits our ability to claim that
our crossing-point management hypothesis can be generalized. As a
preliminary check on whether the contract terms in our seven
contracts are common in other outsourcing contracts, we turned to a
collection of 60 outsourcing contracts compiled by Professor George
Geis1 27 in order to begin to explore the extent to which the predicted
types of contract clauses can be found in other outsourcing
contracts. These contracts cover a fairly broad range of outsourced
goods and services, including manufacturing, database management,
call center services, human resource services, network management
services, website development and maintenance services, check
processing, and airplane maintenance. Professor Geis was kind
enough to identify his contracts for us, and we have conducted an
independent analysis of his contracts.
All 60 contracts in the Geis sample were adopted by the parties
between 1994 and 2007.128 Of these, 27 were signed in years 1994-
2000, and 33 were signed in 2001-2007.129 When we read the
contracts in the sample, however, we learned that not all 60 of the
contracts were outsourcing contracts in the sense that we use the
term in this Article. Specifically, Professor Geis classified contracts as
outsourcing contracts in cases where a firm had the internal
capability to perform the contracted work,' whereas we are
interested in cases where work was previously actually performed in-
house and then later outsourced to another entity. For our analysis,
we retained contracts in the Geis sample where it seemed plausible
that the work was previously performed in-house but did not include
contracts where it seemed unlikely that the work was previously
performed in-house. In particular, we eliminated contracts where the
service provider was promising to provide what seemed to be IT
services wholly new to the customer. We also eliminated one
contract where the parties were a parent and subsidiary because,
127. Outsourcing Transactions, supra note 10.
128. Id. at 258.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 257 & n.48.
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given the close relatedness of the entities, it was not clear that work
was being moved outside the boundary of the firm. Once we
eliminated those contracts, we were left with 44 outsourcing
contracts from the Geis sample. Of those 44, 20 were entered into
between 1994 and 2000 and 24 were entered into between 2001
and 2007."' We looked for the presence of certain provisions in
these 44 Geis contracts that we suggest above would help to thin
crossing points, assist in the specification, standardization and/or
measurement of performance, or help to manage thicker crossing
points.
Although this Geis-based sample is substantially larger than our
sample, it is still not definitive, and we remain uncertain about
whether we can generalize about the role and use of the terms we
discussed in Part III for several reasons.
First, the Geis sample of contracts might well be biased also. To
be sure, they are less biased than the small sample that we studied
closely in this project because they were negotiated and drafted by
lawyers in a number of law firms. But the Geis sample might well
exhibit other biases. For example, Geis constructed his sample from
contracts that had been disclosed in firms' financial disclosure
documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission." 2
This implies that his sample contracts all involved publicly traded
firms on at least one side of the transaction. Moreover, SEC-
registered firms are only required to disclose such documents if they
are "material" (which means they must be rather large compared
with the firm's overall operations) and not "highly-sensitive," a
condition that is subject to multiple interpretations.' Therefore,
this sample undoubtedly under-represents both small
131. Id. at 258-59.
132. Id. at 256.
133. Other researchers who have attempted to survey or compile data on publicly
disclosed contracts by SEC-registered companies have reported that disclosure is "highly
irregular," and that within the documents that have actually been disclosed, there is very little
redaction, suggesting that the contents are not regarded as "highly sensitive" by the disclosing
firms. See, e.g., Susan Maples, Finding Contracts on Securities Disclosures Databases,
http://www.slideshare.net/pwyp/susan-maples-pwyp-montreal-conference 
-2009 (analyzing
confidentiality clauses in disclosed contracts); Paul Wachter, Human Rights Clinic Exposes
Corrupt Oil, Mining Contracts, http://www.law.columbia.edu/media-inquiries/news
events/2007/DecemberO7/Africaoil.
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contracts and outsourcing arrangements that the parties regard as
highly sensitive."'
Second, the vast majority of the Geis contracts involve domestic
rather than international outsourcing.' Once we conducted our
own review of his contracts, we found that, of the original 60
contracts, 59 Geis contracts provided addresses for customer and
service provider; of these, 53 involved outsourcing between two U.S.
firms, one involved two Canadian firms, one involved two UK firms,
and one involved two German firms. Only three contracts in his
sample are clearly international in scope. * Thus, while our sample is
biased in favor of international transactions, his appears to be biased
against them. Still the comparison of these different samples could
prove fruitful.
Third, we have not so far searched through the Geis contracts
exhaustively; instead, we identified a few provisions that we believe
are unusual in other types of contracts but that we believe are
important in managing the special nature of outsourcing
relationships, and looked for the presence of those provisions in the
contracts.
And, fourth, we have not so far evaluated the Geis data with any
sophisticated statistical methodologies. Instead, we simply compared
the frequency of these provisions in contracts negotiated over time
to get a sense of whether they seem to provide support for our
predictions. A more sophisticated analysis of these contracts would
be the subject of a follow-on project.
As an example of a term that thins crossing points, we looked to
see how many of the Geis contracts in each period identified specific
personnel or positions within each company who would have the
authority to negotiate work statements or changes. Of the 44
contracts we categorize as outsourcing arrangements, 30, or 68.1%,
had such clauses."' Of the 20 contracts entered into from 1994 and
2000, 13, or 65%, had such clauses, while 17, or 70.8%, of the 24
134. Highly sensitive contracts might be underrepresented because firms are sometimes
able to obtain exceptions from the SEC so that they can avoid making highly sensitive
contracts public.
135. Outsourcing Transactions, supra note 10, at 258.
136. The fact that only 3 of these contracts appear to present offshoring (not the 12 that
Geis thought he had) might well explain Geis' puzzling conclusion that offshoring has no
effect on contract form. Id. at 291.
137. See infra Table 1.
305
263
HeinOnline  -- 2011 BYU L. Rev. 305 2011
contracts entered into from 2001 through 2007, had such clauses.138
Although the sample of contracts is too small to draw hard
conclusions, the significant portion and modest increase in the
frequency of provisions designating specific personnel who would
have authority to modify contract terms over time is consistent with
the hypothesis that contracting parties may be discovering value in
including them in their agreements.
As examples of contract provisions that help to specify,
standardize, or measure contract performance, we looked for the
presence of (1) contract terms that identified or described the
adoption of specific performance standards (as well as providing
consequences for failure to comply with the standards), and (2)
provisions that call for third-party benchmarking.
Table 1 indicates that approximately 80% of the 44 Geis
contracts had clauses adopting specific performance standards. In
addition, the trend toward including these provisions was clear: in
the earlier period, 65% of the contracts included explicit performance
standards, and in the later period the frequency jumped to 91.6%.19
One might expect an even higher percentage of outsourcing
contracts to adopt performance standards, but it could be that many
outsourcing arrangements defer a discussion of the performance
standards to the individual work statements rather than placing them
in the Master Agreement. In any event, nearly all contracts we
studied that had been drafted since 2001 included explicit
performance standards.
Meanwhile, only 4 (20%) of the 20 contracts in the early period
provided for third-party benchmarking and auditing, while 9 (37.5%)
of 24 contracts signed in the later period have such clauses,
according to Table 1.140 Here again, this is suggestive of some
learning over time of the value of these provisions in outsourcing
contracts. This increase in contract clause adoption could also reflect
the rapid development in recent years of available third-party
assurance services worldwide, providing an institutional basis to
support reliance on third-party benchmarking and auditing.14'
Contractual requirements that the service provider develop a
specific business continuity plan for ensuring performance in the
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Assurance Services, supra note 59, at 332-35.
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event that external events threaten routine functioning of the parties
under the contract strongly suggest that the parties believe that the
customer firm will become highly dependent on the performance of
the supplier firm once the customer winds down or eliminates its
own internal capability of carrying out the activities that are the
subject of the contract. Yet the Geis contracts do not reflect a high
rate of usage of such clauses, with only 7 (35%) of the contracts in
the earlier period, and 8 (33.3%) of the contracts in the later period
containing such clauses.'4 2 This low rate could be a function of the
fact that very few of these contracts call for international
outsourcing.
In terms of managing thick crossing points, we looked for (1)
customer rights of control over supplier personnel, and (2)
termination services provisions.
Regarding control rights, we searched the contracts for clauses
that gave the customer rights of control over at least some of the
service provider's personnel, as well as clauses that specifically
disclaim that these service provider personnel are employees of the
customer. Not all outsourcing contracts will warrant such control
rights. A customer that outsources the production of basic product
inputs (i.e., set screws) presumably does not need to keep tabs on
the employees producing those inputs. Like Baldwin's pot hook
example, some outsourcing could entail almost exclusively thin
crossing points. 143 Thus we would not expect to see these control
rights in all outsourcing contracts, but we should see them in some.
In those sample contracts drafted between 1994 and 2000, only 6,
or 30%, contained provisions granting the customer control rights
over service provider personnel, and 10 out of 20, or 50%, included a
provision stating that personnel performing the outsourced work
were not employees of the customer. 4 4 For those contracts drafted
in 2000 or later, the frequency of these provisions is somewhat
higher.145 Nine, or 37.5%, of the 24 contracts in the second period
give the customer personnel control rights, while 18 out of 24, or
75%, include provisions denying that the personnel are employees of
customer.14 6
142. See infra Table 1.
143. See supra pp. 121-22.
144. See infra Table 1.
145. Id.
146. Id.
307
263
HeinOnline  -- 2011 BYU L. Rev. 307 2011
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Finally, we looked for provisions requiring the service provider to
perform services for the customer in the event of termination of the
contract. Here we see an unchanging incidence in the use of these
provisions: 9 of the 20 contracts in the earlier period, or 45%,
included them while 11 of 24, or 45.8%, of the contracts entered
into since then included them. 4 1 In sum, the Geis contracts provide
more general evidence, albeit not always strong, of parties using
contract clauses in ways that we predict. If a trend can be discerned,
it seems to be in favor of greater incorporation of most of these
clauses over time, however.
C. Litigation over Outsourcing Contracts
What we do not know yet is whether the inclusion of these
clauses makes the outsourcing relationship successful over time. Do
the parties sustain their outsourcing relationship for longer periods
on average if the contracts contain more of the specialized contract
provisions we identify? Are they less likely to find themselves in
disputes that lead to litigation?
To our knowledge there has been little litigation over
outsourcing agreements. We performed a search for litigation
reported in the news media or through written judicial opinions and
found only seven cases filed involving outsourcing contracts (six filed
in U.S. courts and one in English courts). No doubt this number is
underinclusive. Our efforts would have failed to uncover disputes
that are litigated elsewhere and/or arbitrated without press
attention, so it seems unlikely that these cases describe the universe
of disputes. Nevertheless, they provide a glimpse into circumstances
in which outsourcing has gone wrong.
In all except one case, the service provider sued the customer,
typically either because the outsourcing relationship had been
terminatedl48 or because a portion of the outsourced activity had
147. Id.
148. In Computer Sers. Corp. v. Sears, for example, CSC filed suit against Sears to enjoin
Sears' termination of the parties' outsourcing agreement. The parties disputed whether Sears'
termination was for cause, and they eventually settled their dispute in mediation, at which
point Sears agreed to pay CSC an undisclosed sum. Carol Sliwa, Sears Ends IT Pact; CSC Seeks
Payment, 39 COMPUTERWORLD, May 23, 2005, at 1, 55. In Metavance Corp. v. Emigrant
Say. Bank, Metavante sued for nonpayment of technology services provided and for the
termination fee provided in the contract for convenience-based termination. No. 05-CV-1221,
2009 WL 2058449 (E.D. Wis. July 6, 2009). Metavante won on all counts but was entitled to
less than the full termination fee. Id. at *3-4. In Vertex Data Sci. Ltd. v. Powergen, Vertex sued
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been taken back in house.' 4 9 in one case, Sourcecorp BPS, Inc. v.
Kenwood Records Management, the service provider argued that a
contract provision giving the service provider the exclusive right to
perform the outsourced service precluded the customer from taking
the work back in house.'s The court disagreed, finding that the
exclusivity provision did no more than prevent the customer from
using another outsource service provider.' In at least four of the six
cases involving partial or full termination, the service provider
attempted to prevent the termination.'5 2 In at least two of these
cases, the service provider argued that the termination was for
convenience rather than cause and the customer was therefore
obligated to pay termination fees as provided in the contract."s5
In the case where a customer (Sprint) sued the service provider
(IBM), Sprint argued that IBM owed it damages and free work
because it failed to achieve agreed-upon productivity gains, failed to
provide auditable data to support its claimed productivity gains, and
failed to comply with contractually specified methods for measuring
productivity.' In all of these cases the parties end up fighting about
the terms that we believe are characteristic of, if not unique to,
Powergen seeking an injunction against Powergen's announced termination (allegedly for a
material breach) of the outsourcing arrangement. [2006] EWHC (Comm) 1340 (Eng.), 2006
WL 2629805.
149. In Sourcecorp BPS, Inc. v. Kenwood Records Mgmt., Inc., Kenwood had outsourced
document imaging services that it had contracted to provide to one of its clients. 548 F. Supp.
2d 673, 674 (S.D. Iowa 2008). When Sourcecorp failed to adequately perform the required
services, Kenwood performed some of the imaging itself. Id. at 677. In Elec. Data Sys. Corp. v.
Xerox, EDS agreed to perform IT services, application development and management services
for Xerox, but thereafter Xerox pulled back the servicing of employee laptops. 709 N.Y.S.2d
46, 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). EDS sued to get its work back but later dropped the suit in
exchange for a 5-year extension on the basic outsourcing arrangement. Id.; Nick Huber, EDS
Drops Xerox Suit and Signs Up for Five More Years, COMPUTER WEEKLY, Dec. 16, 2001, at
10.
150. Sourcecorp, 548 F. Supp. 2d at 678-79.
151. Id. at 680-81. The finding in this case, if it applies broadly, suggests that the
customer corporation retains the right to bring the activity back in-house unless it specifically
gives away that right in the contracts. We did not see any contracts that constrained the
customer companies from undertaking the contracted activity itself again except by means of
the general termination provisions.
152. Id.; EDS, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 47; Vertex, [2006] EWHC (Comm) 1340 (Eng.); Sliwa,
supra note 148.
153. Metavante, 2009 WL 2058449; Sliwa, supra note 148.
154. The Sprint v. IBM case eventually settled without disclosure of its financial details.
Randall S. Parks, Two Recent Cases Provide Some Rare Insight into What In-House Counsel
Need To Know, 21 CORP. COUNS. 1 (2006).
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outsourcing contracts-terms put in place to thin crossing points, to
specify, standardize or measure, or to help the parties to manage the
inevitable thickness of the relationship. Perhaps future litigation
(which will likely be generated by the recent worldwide financial
crisis and current recession) can tell us more about the effectiveness
(or not) of the types of contract terms that we identify in this article.
V. CONCLUSION
The contracts we examined for this project are extraordinary
documents that attempt to specify and codify detailed terms of
relationships that had previously been structured and governed by
fiat. One possible reason why the firms enter into these relationships
is that these contract devices reduce transaction costs to the point
that transactions are cheaper than in-house transfers for the firm.
Another possibility, however, is that the firm may be better able to
take advantage of other cost savings, such as reduced labor costs and
economies of scale and specialization, that outsourcing can provide
only if outsourcing contracts successfully develop to the point where
they could both effectively thin crossing points and manage the
remaining thickness of the outsourcing relationship. Over time, the
key to effectively contracting for outsourcing may turn on the
modularization of outsourcing contracts, the modularization of the
processes and work to be performed over the life of the outsourcing
relationship, and the development of adequate contracting
infrastructure such as model terms, tested language, and the
emergence of an inspection and auditing industry that can perform
third-party evaluation and benchmarking.
Our assessment of outsourcing contracts examined for this article
challenges theoretical claims about the requirement of modularity for
governance by contract, rather than by hierarchy, to be effective.
Transactions do not have to occur only at extremely thin crossing
points, because contracting techniques can be used to help the
parties manage the vulnerability associated with contracting at
relatively thick crossing points. Nonetheless, where parties attempt to
insert firm boundaries at thick crossing points-places in the flow of
productive activity where there is a high level of interconnection
among the parties-new contracting technology must be used to
manage relationships that in the past would have been managed by
fiat within a hierarchy. Some of these contracts seem so complex,
however, that they raise questions about whether they will, in fact,
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reduce transactions costs and/or improve productivity over time.
But as contracting technology evolves and develops, we expect to see
more standardization of tools and terms that, in the long run, could
make outsourcing increasingly feasible and attractive.
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TABLE 1
Contracts Sined in 1994 - 2000
Total Contracts: 20
Clauses
Contracts
Containing
Such Clauses
Number
Percenta re
Specific Negotiating Personnel 13 65%
Adoption of Specific Performance Standards 13 65%
Third Party Benchmarking & Auditing 4 20%
Disaster Continuity Plan 7 35%
Personnel Control Rights 6 30%
SP Employees Not Client Employees 10 50%
Termination Services 9 45%
Contracts Signed in 2001 - 2007
Total Contracts: 24
Contracts
Containing
Clauses Such Clauses
Number
Percentage
Specific Negotiating Personnel 17 70.8%
Adoption of Specific Performance Standards 22 91.6%
Third Party Benchmarking & Auditing 9 37.5%
Disaster Continuity Plan 8 33.3%
Personnel Control Rights 9 37.5%
SP Employees Not Client Employees 18 75%
Termination Services 11 45.8%
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APPENDIX
The following is a description of seven contracts examined for
this article. Documents 1.1.B and 1.1.C are based on a common
form contract (which was Document 1.1.A in our files). Document
2.5 was negotiated, but never signed because the customer company
ultimately decided against outsourcing the project that was the
object of the negotiations.
Description of Documents:
Document 1.1.B: Master Services Agreement, based on Contract
I.1.A Form, by a large U.S.-based financial services firm with a
service provider in India for call center services and customer services
(for financial institution's customers). Agreement was signed by both
service provider parent company in India and service provider's U.S.-
based subsidiary (with latter having joint and several liability) to
ensure customer would have recourse against a U.S. party with U.S.
assets. Expected value of services was tens of millions of dollars per
year. Details of specific services to be worked out in separate
Statements of Work. Term of Master Agreement is indefinite. Signed
in 2004.
Document 1.1.C: Master Services Agreement, based on Contract
I.1.A Form, by a large U.S.-based financial services firm with a large,
prominent U.S.-based services provider for finance and accounting
services and human resources services. Service provider intended to
provide services from its operations and personnel in the Philippines
and India. Expected value of services over time was hundreds of
millions of dollars. Details of specific services to be worked out in
separate Statements of Work. Term of Master Agreement is
indefinite. Signed in 2006.
Document 1.2: Master Systems Implementation Services
Agreement, by U.S.-based manufacturing company recently out of
bankruptcy, with U.S. subsidiary of large Indian services company,
for implementation work related to a new information technology
(IT) system. Majority of software development, support, and related
work was to be provided by personnel in India. Expected value of
services was about $20 million. Details of specific services to be
worked out in separate Statements of Work. Term of Master
Agreement is 5 years, with up to 2 renewal terms. Signed in 2005.
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Document 1.3: Master Services Agreement, by U.S.-based
electric and gas utility company, with large U.S.-based service
provider for a variety of IT services. Service provider was to use U.S.-
based personnel but had option to use personnel in Philippines and
India for some services. Expected value of services was about $500
billion. Details of specific services to be worked out in separate Work
Agreements. Term of Master Agreement is 10 years. Signed in 2007.
(This is longest contract in sample, at 234 pages including 14
exhibits.)
Document 2.4: Master Information Technology Services
Agreement, by large U.S.-based financial services company, with a
large U.S.-based services provider, for hosting of servers and
applications support. Data center located in U.S., and majority of
services to be provided by U.S.-based personnel, although service
provider has the option to subcontract work and to send work
offshore. Expected value of contract was about $100 million over life
of contract. Details of specific services to be worked out in separate
Supplements. Term of Master Agreement is indefinite except that it
is to be a minimum of 6 months after the termination of any
Supplement. Default term of Supplements is one year from
execution date of each Supplement unless Supplement provides
otherwise. Signed in 2004.
Document 2.5: Master Services Agreement by large U.S.-based
software company, with large Indian service provider, for
development of software application for a particular industry. U.S.-
based subsidiary of service provider was to be a party, as well as
Indian parent company. Details of specific services to be worked out
in separate Statements of Work. Term was to be for 5 years, with
automatic extensions unless customer decides against continuing.
This contract was ultimately not signed because U.S.-based customer
became concerned that the deal would help create a new competitor.
Document 2.6: Master Services Agreement by large consumer
electronics and communications company, with Scandinavian parent
company and certain U.S. subsidiaries, for manufacturing of
consumer electronics. Manufacturing was to be done in an Eastern
European facility. Details of services and production to be specified
in Work Orders and Statements of Work. Service provider may
subcontract work only as specifically agreed by customer. Term of
agreement was redacted. Signed in 2004.
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